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Entrepreneurs are central to many issues in economics. They are visualized as engines of growth 
that make innovations, create employment and wealth. Accordingly, economists have done a 
good deal of research on various aspects of entrepreneurship, such as on the process of entry or 
selection to entrepreneurship and on the characteristics of entrepreneurs. However, the literature 
on the saving behavior of entrepreneurs is surprisingly small. While some researchers have 
reported that entrepreneurs have a higher wealth accumulation rate than the rest of the 
population, a rigorous empirical analysis does not exist. Furthermore, assuming that these 
households do accumulate wealth faster, it is still not clear what part of wealth change gives us 
this result. Do entrepreneurial households save a higher percentage of their household income 
than others? Do they get rich by investing at the right time in some assets whose prices increase 
significantly? Or, do they inherit most of their wealth?  
Given the important role of entrepreneurs in the accumulation of household wealth, 
answering such questions is important both for building realistic models of consumption and 
saving and for making informed policy decisions. A large class of calibrated models of 
consumption is known to be incapable of generating the extreme concentration of wealth 
observed in the data. Recently, it has been shown that a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
consumption with entrepreneurial choice can do a better job of generating a wealth distribution 
that is closer to reality (Quadrini 1997). Although this is a significant contribution, there is no 
consensus in the empirical literature on the validity of the underlying assumptions of such 
models, such as the assumption that the wealth of entrepreneurial households increases faster 
because they face liquidity constraints.  
Certainly, a better understanding of the relationship between household wealth and 
entrepreneurship is key to understanding the role of public policy in entrepreneurship. First, 
financial constraints and imperfections in the capital markets are assumed to prevent some 
entrepreneurs with bright projects from starting a business. To alleviate these constraints, the 
U.S. government pays out billions of dollars annually in loans to entrepreneurs even though it is 
still not clear how deterrent these financial constraints are for potential entrepreneurs. Second, 
tax policy can have large effects both on the households’ entrepreneurial choice and on the 
saving and investment behavior of entrepreneurs. High tax rates on the returns to entrepreneurial   3
activity can discourage entry and low rates can create an incentive for high-income households 
to establish a business. The stimulation caused by the low corporate tax rate may indeed 
increase entrepreneurial activity and wealth accumulation. But it may also cause high-income 
and high-wealth households to classify their earnings as entrepreneurial income instead of wage 
income, only to take advantage of tax differences (Gentry and Hubbard 2000b). Therefore, it is 
possible that the link between wealth and entrepreneurship is related to the tax schedule faced 
by workers versus entrepreneurs, and not related to any financial constraints. 
In this paper, I start by verifying the finding that, in a cross-section, entrepreneurial 
households have both higher wealth and higher wealth-income ratios. I contribute to the 
literature by analyzing the saving behavior of these households in more detail. Specifically, I 
decompose wealth change into its active and passive components using wealth and saving data 
of U.S. households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period between 
1984 and 1994
1. The passive part of wealth change is capital gains, whereas active saving is the 
amount of actual investment made. After making this decomposition, I compare the saving 
behavior of entrepreneurial households to that of others. Crucially, while comparing the saving 
rates, I control for the possible endogeneity of entrepreneurial choice to saving decision. 
My findings indicate that entrepreneurial households save more out of their family 
income, even when investment in business assets are excluded from the saving rate definition. 
However, it is ambiguous if they have higher rate of wealth increase, a higher rate of return on 
capital or a higher ratio of inheritance to wealth. I show that the decision to own a business is 
endogenous to the saving rate and to the rate of capital gains on wealth, although the 
endogeneity is weak in some samples, especially for the capital gains regressions. Furthermore, 
I do not find any evidence for the claim that households save more to start a business. Finally, I 
do not detect endogeneity in the rate of return to wealth or in the inheritance rate regressions.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on 
entrepreneurship and wealth. Section 3 presents the decomposition of wealth change into its 
components. Section 4 defines the term “entrepreneur” and finds its empirical counterpart. 
Sections 5 and 6 report descriptive statistics on the income, wealth and demographic 
characteristics of entrepreneurial households. Section 7 tests whether entrepreneurs have higher 
wealth-income ratios. Longitudinal analyses are in section 8, which presents descriptive   4
statistics and regressions describing the saving behavior of entrepreneurs. Section 9 summarizes 




Previous work on wealth and entrepreneurship has demonstrated that household wealth is 
correlated with the entrepreneurial status of that household. Several hypotheses have been built 
to explain why entrepreneurial households own more wealth. Many of them have the existence 
of liquidity constraints as their centerpiece. Inspired by the observation that personal savings 
and funds from friends and relatives play a crucial role in the formation of businesses, one 
hypothesis states that borrowing constraints select wealthy households into entrepreneurship 
(see Evans and Jovanovic (1989)). The idea is that starting a business requires an initial 
investment and external financing of this investment is limited. Therefore, only those 
households with sufficient internal funds are able to establish viable businesses. Businesses 
established by poor households will be under-capitalized; therefore they will have a lower 
chance of survival. 
It has also been hypothesized that liquidity constraints encourage entrepreneurial 
households to save more. Anticipating entrepreneurial activity, households may be increasing 
their saving. Here, high costs of borrowing may be playing a role along with the limitations on 
the amount borrowed. When modeling entrepreneurial choice, Quadrini (1997) and Gentry and 
Hubbard (2000a) suppose that potential entrepreneurs face higher costs of external financing 
than for internal financing. If the business is financed completely by the household’s internal 
funds, the cost of capital is only the opportunity cost. But when internal funds are not sufficient 
and external funding is required, the unit cost of debt is an increasing function of the ratio of 
debt to capital. In a dynamic setting, the higher cost of external finance may create an additional 
incentive to save for low initial wealth entrepreneurs by increasing their marginal return to 
saving. In fact, Quadrini (1997) shows that a calibrated model with entrepreneurs who face 
borrowing constraints and costly external financing does a better job than a standard life-cycle 
model of consumption and saving, of generating a highly skewed wealth distribution as 
observed in the data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Although wealth data are available for the year 1999, the “Active Savings” file, which allows me to decompose   5
The notion that the existence of liquidity constraints is the reason behind the correlation 
between entrepreneurship and wealth has been challenged. Cressy (2000) demonstrates 
theoretically that decreasing absolute risk aversion alone can generate a positive correlation 
between wealth and business start-ups regardless of any borrowing constraints, in a world 
similar to that of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) but with uncertainty and risk aversion.  Hurst and 
Lusardi (2001) argue that the positive correlation between wealth and entrepreneurship can be 
due to many reasons and “does not necessarily reflect only the fact that liquidity constraints 
exist and are binding.” They extend the model of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) by deriving the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur implied by the model. They show that this probability, 
conditional on entrepreneurial ability, is an increasing and weakly concave function of wealth 
when the liquidity constraints are binding, but is independent of wealth when liquidity 
constraints are not binding. Their regression analyses based on the PSID data reveal that the 
effect of wealth on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur (business owner) is in fact very 
small for the majority of the wealth distribution. Surprisingly, only a small group of very 
wealthy households, namely the top 3% of the wealth distribution, drives the correlation 
between wealth and entrepreneurship. At lower levels of wealth, there is no effect of increasing 
wealth on the decision to become an entrepreneur. Their conclusion is that, entrepreneurs are 
wealthier because they are “different” from the rest of the population, probably in their 
preferences, attitudes toward risk or in their motives to save.  
Meyer (1990) examines racial differences in self-employment rates and tries to explain 
the reasons behind the low self-employment rate among blacks. He examines liquidity 
constraints by estimating logit equations for who is self-employed in a cross-section and who 
becomes self-employed in a panel. His estimates suggest that net worth is not an important 
determinant of the racial differences in self-employment. He also uses the observation from 
small business starting capital data that little capital is needed to start most businesses. If 
financial constraints were decisive, one would see a greater relative representation of blacks in 
industries requiring less starting capital. However, the author does not see such a pattern in the 
data. Therefore, he concludes that there is no evidence that financial resources play a role in the 
transition into entrepreneurship. This is an important finding, since it goes against the perception 
that minority business owners are more likely to be financially constrained.      
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the wealth change has not been released yet.   6
The empirical testing of these hypotheses on the relationship between wealth and 
entrepreneurship has been somewhat limited. Typically, to examine the role of initial assets on 
being or becoming an entrepreneur, these studies have made use of a probit type regression that 
expresses the probability of being or becoming an entrepreneur as a function of wealth and other 
individual and household variables. Using various data sources, these studies have reported a 
positive, large and statistically significant effect of wealth in these regressions. In their widely 
cited paper, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) build and test a model, in which candidates are 
restricted to borrow only up to a multiple of their own assets, by using data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS) for 1966-81. Their model implies that there is a 
positive correlation between the probability of starting a business and assets if and only if there 
are liquidity constraints, and that entrepreneurial earnings and initial assets are positively 
correlated. Also, they reject an alternative hypothesis that wealthy individuals are high 
entrepreneurial ability individuals. Evans and Leighton (1989) examine the selection into self-
employment using data from the NLS for years 1966-81 and the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) for years 1968-87. They find a robust relationship between the probability of switching 
into self-employment and net worth, which seem to support the findings of Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989). Another paper that reports a similar finding is Gentry and Hubbard (2000a), which uses 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data in years 1983 and 1989.  
One problem with these studies is that they assume household wealth is exogenous to 
entrepreneurial choice and therefore it is a good proxy for liquidity constraints, while in fact, 
wealth is an endogenous variable. A better idea would be to restrict the analysis to exogenous 
movements in wealth and check how the household’s propensity to start a business is affected 
by exogenous wealth transfers. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) use data on 
inheritances and showed that households that received such transfers were more likely to 
become an entrepreneur or to be more successful in entrepreneurship. They interpret their 
finding as an evidence of the importance of liquidity constraints, which may be true unless it 
merely reflects the intergenerational transfer of businesses or business ability as part of the 
inheritance received and not the existence of liquidity constraints. 
Some authors, including Gentry and Hubbard (2000a) and Quadrini (1999), have 
claimed that causality not only runs from wealth to entrepreneurship, but also from 
entrepreneurship to wealth. They have noticed that, controlling for household characteristics,   7
business owners have higher wealth-income ratios than others. Based on this, they argue that 
entrepreneurial households must have higher saving rates.  Gentry and Hubbard (2000a) report 
higher saving-income ratios for entrants and continuing entrepreneurs than those who leave or 
stay out of entrepreneurship, after controlling for all demographic variables. Although 
informative, these studies do not attempt to account for the possible endogeneity between the 
decisions to start a business and to save. 
 
3. DEFINITION OF SAVING 
 
I employ a wealth-accounting framework similar to the one used by Gittleman and Wolff (2001) 
in their analysis of racial differences in wealth. As in the standard two-period inter-temporal 
consumption choice problem, the agent chooses period one consumption to maximize the utility 
from consumption in periods one and two, subject to the 1
st-period budget constraint  
1 1 1 1 A Y I C + = +             (3.1) 
and the wealth accumulation rule  
] ) 1 [( 2 , 1 1 2 1 2 T I r E A + + = ,            ( 3 . 2 )  
where  t C ,  t I ,  t Y  and t A  are consumption, investment, income and wealth,  respectively, in 
period t.  2 , 1 T  is the transfer of wealth such as inheritances, gifts and insurance settlements made 
to the household between periods one and two.  ] [ 1 ⋅ E  is the expectations operator as of period 
one. The average return to the portfolio of assets is represented by  t r . For simplicity, I assume 
that asset allocation remains unchanged from period one to two. The constraints in (3.1) and 
(3.2) can be combined into  ] ) )( 1 [( 2 , 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 T C Y A r E A + − + + = .    (3.3)   
Therefore, in period two, the value of wealth depends on the amount of investment made 
in period one, as well as on the expected values of the return to the investment and on the 
expected value of the wealth transfer. The change in wealth, or saving between the two periods 
can be written as 
)] ( [ ] [ ) ( 1 1 1 2 1 2 , 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 , 1 C Y A r E T E C Y A A A − + + + − = − ≡ ∆ .     (3.4) 
In this expression, the change in wealth is decomposed into three components: saving 
out of household income, wealth transfers and capital gains, represented by the first, second and 
the third terms in the above expression, respectively. The PSID collects data on various asset   8
holdings of households every five years. Also the amounts of investments made in major asset 
categories and the amount of inheritances and gifts received are asked. More information about 
the empirical specification of wealth components will be given later in the paper.  
Using expression (3.4), the following (ex-post) rates can be defined: The rate of return 
on wealth is  1 2 , 1 / A A ∆ , while the rate of return on capital is  1 1 1 1 2 / ) ( A C Y A r − + . The rate of 
saving out of family income (or, shortly, the saving rate) is defined as  1 1 1 / ) ( Y C Y − . Finally, the 
inheritance-to-wealth ratio is defined as  1 2 , 1 1 / ] [ A T E . Naturally, these rates are defined only 
when the denominators are positive. 
 
4. DEFINITION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
The term “entrepreneurship” can have quite different meanings in different contexts. Some 
people visualize an entrepreneur as someone who makes active business investments and creates 
jobs while others reserve the term for someone who is self-employed or has self-employment 
income. The choice of the definition of entrepreneurship is inherently linked to both the problem 
analyzed and the dataset used.  
   The PSID collects information on the business ownership as well as the employment 
status of the household head. Therefore, the term “entrepreneur” can be defined as someone 
who is self-employed or, alternatively, as someone who owns a business.  In the data, business 
ownership and self-employment rates are very close and for the majority of the cases being a 
business owner corresponds to being self-employed. However, a non-negligible percentage of 
the population reports being one but not the other. For instance, in 1984, the business ownership 
rate is 13.30% while the self-employment rate is 12.36%. Among business owners, 65% report 
being self-employed (i.e. working for self only or working for both self and someone else), 26% 
report working only for someone else and the remaining 9% report being either unemployed or 
out of the labor force.  Since the analysis in this paper is based on wealth and saving, I prefer to 
use the “business ownership” definition of entrepreneurship
2.  
 
                                                           
2I should mention that the PSID keeps track of households and not businesses. As a result, when a household 
reports being a business owner year after year, it does not necessarily mean that the household kept the same 
business in all those years.      9
5. WEALTH, INCOME AND ENTREPRENEURIAL STATUS  
 
Previous work on entrepreneurship has already documented the high concentration of 
entrepreneurial households in the top wealth and income classes (Quadrini 1999, and Gentry 
and Hubbard 2000).  These households own a substantial share of household wealth and 
income. Moreover, this share increases throughout both the wealth and the income distribution.  
I start my analyses by confirming this observation.  
As shown in Table 1A, it is clear that business owners make up a much higher 
percentage of total net worth (NW) than their population share. Only 12% of the entire sample 
are business owners, but these households hold 42% of total net worth. The same pattern can be 
seen for the percentiles of wealth. For almost all wealth classes, and especially for the 
wealthiest, NW shares of business owners within that class exceed their population shares
3. 
Among the richest one fifth, 30% are business owners and they own 48% of total NW in that 
class. Of the wealthiest 1%, 76% are business owners and their wealth makes up 84% of total 
NW in that percentile. 
Table 1B displays a picture similar to that in Table 1A. It shows that households with 
businesses own a higher percentage of total income (19.9%) than their population share 
(12.2%). As in the previous table, a concentration of business owners in the upper income 
percentiles is noticeable. However, their concentration is higher in upper wealth classes than it 
is in upper income classes.  
The high concentration of business owners in the upper wealth percentiles can not be 
explained only by their incomes. As shown in Table 2B, business owners have higher wealth-
income ratios than others. This finding, reported also by other researchers, such as Gentry and 
Hubbard, and Quadrini, implies that business owners have a higher wealth accumulation rate 
compared to others. However, I must mention that under-reporting of income by business 
owners could be an issue here. Evans and Leighton (1989) caution against “taking reported self-
employment earnings at face value.” Although they use a different data source, it can be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
3 The representation of business owners in total NW of the lowest wealth class really stands out. Within this class, 
business owners hold only 0.58% of the population, but 23% of total NW. We can attribute this to business losses 
since the lowest 20% of the wealth distribution hold negative NW. The same argument applies to Table 1B, in 
which the share of business owners in the lowest income class is notable. Within this class, total income is positive 
while business owners’ total income is negative.   10
problem with entrepreneurial earnings in general. It is easy to guess that business owners under-
report their income for tax evasion. But the reason could be more innocent: business owners 
could fail to report retained earnings.  
Table 2A shows mean and median wealth and its components. As expected, households 
that own a business have a tremendous wealth advantage over those that do not own a business. 
According to the 1984 PSID data, business owners hold five times more wealth than others, in 
terms of both mean and median wealth. Even after taking away business wealth, the advantage 
of business owners remains. Asset ownership rates and asset holdings are higher among 
business owners, for all asset types.  
In addition, portfolio compositions of entrepreneurial households and others are very 
different. As already mentioned in the literature (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000a), the former group 
holds 46% of its mean net worth in business assets, whereas the portfolio of the other group is 
concentrated in home equity. The poor diversification of business owners’ portfolios has been 
related to capital market imperfections. It is possible that these portfolios remain undiversified 
due to a lack of complete information about other assets that the business owner would need to 
buy in order to diversify risk. It is also possible that their desire of control over their businesses 
is the cause.   
 
6. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTREPRENEURS 
 
Before turning to the analysis of the saving behavior of entrepreneurs, it is useful to gather some 
information about the characteristics of entrepreneurs. Are there any noteworthy distinctions 
between the entrepreneurs and others? Are entrepreneurs older and more educated than others? 
Are there any racial differences between the two groups? 
Table 3 shows that the heads of entrepreneurial households are indeed whiter, more 
middle-aged and more educated relative to the heads of other households. As of 1984, an 
amazing 96.6% of business owners are white, therefore racial/ethnic minorities are definitely 
underrepresented among business owners. Household heads that are between 35 and 69 years of 
age make up 64% of entrepreneurs, but 39% of others. 
Entrepreneurial households are mostly (83%) homeowners and almost 70% of them are 
made up of non-elderly married couples. Among non-entrepreneurial households, only 57% are   11
homeowners and 42% are non-elderly married couples. Roughly 90% of entrepreneurial 
household heads are employed, compared to 64% of others. Interestingly, a non-negligible 
percentage of entrepreneurs (9.4%) classify their labor market status as retired.  
 
7. DO ENTREPRENEURS HAVE HIGHER WEALTH-INCOME RATIOS? 
 
To test whether entrepreneurial households have higher wealth-income ratios, I estimate an 
equation of the following type for each of the three cross-sections, 1984, 1989 and 1994:  
 
i i i i X E I W ε γ β α + + + = ' ' / .      ( 7 . 1 )  
 
Here,  i I W /  is the wealth-income ratio
4 of household i,  i E  is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if household i is an entrepreneur and zero if not. I control for a number of household 
characteristics, which are collected in the vector  i X . Control variables include total household 
income
5and its square, age of the household head and its square, the number of children in the 
household, as well as dummy variables for the education, sex, race and marital status of the 
head. Finally,  i ε  is the error term.      
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates and the t-statistics for the business ownership 
dummy. I estimate equation (7.1) for each cross-section and for different sample selection rules. 
First, I include all households in the sample. The results are in column (1). Then, the sample is 
restricted to the households whose heads are between the ages of 22 and 65 and not retired. This 
is done with the purpose of eliminating the households that are not expected to be accumulating 
wealth. The estimates are reported in column (2). One can argue that the results of this 
regression are influenced by a number of households with very low or very high wealth-income 
                                                           
4 Theoretically, W/I ratio should be defined as the wealth-to-permanent income ratio, but with one cross-section, I 
have only annual income data. W/I is a noisy proxy for wealth-to-permanent income ratio since the variance of 
transitory income may differ across households.  
5 Total household income is defined as the sum of taxable and transfer incomes of Head, Wife and other family 
members. Some households report zero or negative total income. I assumed that their incomes are equal to one 
dollar when defining wealth-income ratios of such households. Zero or negative income is not very common in the 
data, mostly due to bottom coding of income in the PSID before 1994. For example, in 1983 only 1% of the 
population was in this category, of which one third were business owners. In 1994 and in later years, when the 
PSID accepts negative income as a legitimate value, the share of negative income is not very different. However, in 
those years the households that report negative income are mostly business owners (62%), as expected.   12
ratios. This is a possibility, since there are some households that report having negative wealth 
and there are also some households whose incomes are assumed to be one dollar (see footnote). 
In order to exclude such outliers, I truncate the top and bottom 1% of the wealth-income ratio 
distribution. The regression results based on this truncated sample are in column (3). From these 
regressions, comes a strong result: The coefficient on the entrepreneurship dummy is positive 
and highly significant, which means that entrepreneurs have higher wealth-income ratios than 
non-entrepreneurs. 
 
8. DO ENTREPRENEURS SAVE MORE? 
 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
The next step of the analysis is to take a look at the changes in wealth. Tables 5A and 5B divide 
the sample of households into four groups, depending on their business ownership status in the 
beginning and end of the period for which the change in wealth is calculated, and report mean 
and median wealth changes for each category.
6 As seen in Table 5A, the group of households 
which started a business during the five years between 1984 and 1989 experienced the highest 
rate of increase in mean wealth, both in terms of the size and the percentage of the increase. 
Those who ended a business experienced a wealth decline. It is interesting that those who 
started a business are the group with the highest wealth increase, even when business assets are 
excluded from the wealth measure, shown in Table 5B.  
Next, I analyze the components of saving. Following the method used by Gittleman and 
Wolff (2001), I decompose wealth change into its active saving and capital gains components. 
The capital gains component of wealth change accounts for the variations in the prices of assets 
held by the household. The active saving component, on the other hand, measures the additions 
to and withdrawals from the household’s assets during the period of analysis. The PSID data 
includes active saving information for some assets, but not for all. For assets for which the 
amount of net inflows is known, the capital gain is calculated simply as the difference between 
the change in the value of the asset during the period and the net addition. For assets for which 
the amount of net inflows is unknown, an appropriate market-based rate of return is assigned to 
                                                           
6 Since wealth data are available every five years, we observe the asset ownership status of households only at a 
five-yearly frequency. We do not observe the transitions that took place during the period. Nor do we know exactly 
when the household changed its status.   13
capital gains. For such assets, active saving is calculated as the difference between the change in 
the value of the asset during the period and capital gains on the asset. Details of this procedure 
are given in the Appendix. 
Of course, this measure of active saving does not correspond to the traditional measure 
of saving defined as the difference between income and consumption, since active savings can 
be funded by some other sources of wealth and not just family income. Inheritances, assets or 
debts brought into the family by persons joining the family and cashing in of annuities are 
possible sources of funds. In order to have a measure of saving out of one’s family income, the 
amount of savings funded by sources other than family income need to be subtracted from 
active savings. This measure of saving is called “saving out of family income,” or simply 
“savings.”  
Table 6 decomposes the total change in wealth (net worth) into capital gains, savings, 
inheritances, net inflows due to changes in family composition and net inflows from annuities. 
The mean and median values of each component for four categories of business ownership are 
reported. With the purpose of taking life-cycle factors into account and excluding the 
households that are expected not to accumulate wealth, the sample is restricted to households 
whose heads are between the ages of 22 and 65, and those whose heads are not retired. The top 
and bottom 1% of each saving distribution is truncated to eliminate extreme values. 
According to the descriptive statistics in this table, business ownership seems to be an 
influential factor in determining wealth accumulation. Total change in wealth is the highest for 
those who start a business, followed by those who continue to have a business. Those who stay 
out of business ownership come next, and those who end a business are the last. Those who start 
a business have the highest capital gains and a quite high level of savings (out of income). 
Compared to the group that did not own a business in either the beginning or the end of the 
period, this group has considerably high levels of both capital gains and savings. Those who 
ended a business experienced capital losses and negative savings.  
Comparing the “continue business” group to “stay out of business” group, I notice that 
the saving behaviors of these two groups are considerably different. Those who continue being a 
business owner have a higher overall wealth increase. In addition, they have the highest saving 
rate among all. But, surprisingly, they have experienced capital losses. Therefore, there is not   14
much support here for the argument that business owners get rich by earning capital gains on 
their business assets. 
   The last three items of wealth change are mostly small in magnitude in the sample, with 
zero median values in all of the four groups. There seems to be a difference, though, in the mean 
levels of inheritances received by those who stay out of business ownership and the other three 
groups. Those who stayed out received less in inheritances at the mean. This is because of both 
the smaller receipt rate and the smaller amount received. To clarify, in the 1984-89 panel, the 
receipt rates are 4.37% for those who stay out, compared to 9.71% for those who start a 
business, 12.18% for those who continue and 6.16% of those who end a business. The mean 
amounts of inheritances received, over those who received any inheritances, are $65,000 for 
those who stay out, $143,000 for those who start, $142,000 for those who continue and $85,000 
for those who end a business. This link between business ownership and inheritances could be 
an evidence for intergenerational transmission of business ownership. As mentioned by Hurst 
and Lusardi (2001) and by others, many business families simply pass on their businesses to 
their children.  
Table 7 presents the mean and median values of rates of wealth change and its 
components, using the same sample. All rates, except for the saving rate (out of family income), 
are defined as the level of the corresponding saving component divided by the initial value of 
wealth. The saving rate is defined as savings divided by total household income over the 
analysis period. Mean rates are calculated by dividing the sum of the numerator by the sum of 
the denominator, over all households. Median rates are based on the distribution of household 
rates. Naturally, household rates are defined only when the denominators are positive. 
Therefore, the calculation of median rates excludes households with negative initial wealth. 
   As in the analysis of levels of wealth changes, I detect some gaps between those who 
either started or continued a business and the other two groups. In general, households in the 
first two groups fared better than the others did. Their rates of wealth increase and their saving 
rates are higher, both at the mean and at the median. Those who continued a business mostly 
experienced quite low capital gains rates, or even capital losses. It is worth noting at this point 
that the business ownership classification here is based on the status in the beginning and the 
end of each analysis period. In other words, it is possible that the capital losses made by 
continuing business owners include business failures, if the households with failed businesses   15
opened up other businesses before the end of the period. This could also be the reason behind 
the low rates experienced by continuing business owners in the period 1989-94.  
 
b. Regression Analyses 
To assess the effect of business ownership on wealth accumulation, I run regressions of various 
saving rate measures on a business ownership dummy variable and a number of demographic 
controls. As mentioned before, wealth data are available only every five years but business 
ownership indicator is available every year, therefore there are many ways in which a business 
ownership dummy can be defined.  
In this paper, I use three different dummy variables, which I define in the following 
manner: The first one, “Dummy 1,” is equal to one if the household head is a business owner in 
all years of the analysis period and zero if he is not a business owner in any of those years. 
Using this definition effectively restricts the sample to households which are business owners in 
either all or in none of the years of the analysis period. The second one, “Dummy 2,” takes the 
value of one if the household did not own a business in the first year of the period but becomes a 
business owner sometime during the period and stays one until the end of the period, and it is set 
to zero otherwise. Those who report a transition into and out of business ownership during the 
period are assigned a zero value even if they make a transition into business ownership again 
before the end of the period. This definition creates a sample that is highly representative of 
“successful” businesses by including only the households that maintain their business ownership 
status over time.  Another alternative is “Dummy 3,” which is equal to one if the household 
owns a business in any of the years of the analysis period and zero otherwise. Obviously, this 
definition of business ownership is the most inclusive one. 
Having determined how to identify business ownership status of a household, I estimate 
the following equation by ordinary least squares for each definition of the dummy variable, for 
each saving component and for each period separately. The coefficient estimates of the business 
ownership dummies and their significance levels are shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10, columns I. 
The details of the estimation of the saving rate equation are shown in Table 14, section I. 
 
' ' ii i i YX D u βδ =+ +   .             ( 8 . 1 )  
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Here,  i Y  is the saving component, expressed as a percentage.  i X  is the vector of 
covariates, which include age and its square, average income and its square, education and 
racial/ethnic dummies, number of children in the household and a new child dummy, dummies 
for the sex, homeownership and marital status of the household head and the employment status 
of the head and the wife. The value of initial wealth,  i w , is also included as a regressor. 
Furthermore, in the saving rate regression, I control for capital gains and the variability of 
household income. In the rate of wealth change regressions, I control for the variability of 
household income. (In the capital gains and inheritance rate regressions, none of these are 
controlled for.) I measure the variability of income by the log of the variance of the log of 
income. The argument for adding income variability as an additional regressor comes from the 
saving literature. The idea is that a non-negligible part of household wealth is held as a 
precaution against the uncertainty of income (see for instance, Carroll and Samwick (1998)). I 
control for capital gains in the saving rate and the rate of change in wealth regressions to 
account for the possibility that households adjust their savings up or down by monitoring the 
capital gains they are earning on their assets. Finally, in equation (8.1),  i D  is the business 
ownership dummy as defined previously and  i u  is the error term. 
As the first columns in each section of Tables 8, 9 and 10 show, my estimates suggest 
that it is erroneous to argue that business owners have a higher rate of wealth increase than those 
who do not own a business. The effect of business ownership dummy is ambiguous. The 
coefficient estimate of the business ownership dummy variable takes different signs in different 
periods. Moreover, most of the estimates are not significantly different from zero. In fact, 
similar arguments can be made about the capital gains to wealth ration regressions. In the case 
of inheritances, the coefficient estimates are indistinguishable from zero in most regressions. 
These findings are surprising, since previous evidence lead us to expect positive and significant 
coefficient estimates. Apparently, differences in saving components between business owners 
and others, indicated earlier by descriptive statistics, disappear once the effects of all other 
factors are accounted for.  
What emerges from these regression analyses, though, is some evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that business owners save more out of their family income than others do. In almost   17
all regressions, I find positive and statistically significant effects for the business ownership 
dummy.  
To summarize, multivariate analyses of saving differences between the households that 
are business owners and others show that the former save more out of their family income 
controlling for household characteristics, income, income variability and initial wealth, over the 
periods of analysis. However, in this sample, there is no strong evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that they have higher rates of return on capital or higher rates of wealth increase
7.  
 
Controlling for Endogeneity 
The set of estimates that I have just reported measure the effect of starting a business on the 
saving behavior. However, it is possible that saving rates influence business ownership 
decisions. First of all, entrepreneurial households may increase their saving in anticipation of a 
business opportunity, which may require them to make a down payment. Second, it may be the 
case that households use unanticipated increases in wealth, such as capital gains on property or 
receipts of lump-sum money such as gifts or inheritances to pay for the cost of a business. Third, 
business investment is part of household saving by definition and entrepreneurial households 
may become richer than others via their businesses, all else remaining the same.  
In any case, it is plausible that the decision to start a business is endogenous to the 
decision to save. From an econometric point of view, this can be considered as an omitted 
variable problem, which causes the business ownership decision to be correlated with the saving 
decision of the household.  Therefore, a better way to express the relationship between the 
saving component and the business ownership decision is to write one equation for the saving 
component and another one for the possibly endogenous business ownership decision. The idea 
here is to treat the “starting business” dummy as an endogenous variable and control for its 
endogeneity in the regressions. 
 
With this change, the system of equations takes the following form: 
 
'
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Here, the decision to become a business owner is determined by the value that the latent 
variable 
*
i D  takes. Since all independent variables in the first equation also exist in the second 
equation, I add to the second equation  i FATH , a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household head’s father is a businessman, in order to identify the saving component equation.  
There is one further complication here. Initial wealth is used in the
*
i D  equation to 
control for any cash constraints that households face. Some people would argue rightfully that 
wealth is endogenous to the decision to start a business and that we need to use a more 
exogenous source of funding than household net worth in this equation. In response to this, I 
have decided to use either inheritances or insurance settlements (or their total) received by the 
households one year before the analysis period as an instrument for initial wealth. For instance, 
in the saving rate regression that covers the 1984-1989 period, I use the sum of inheritances and 
insurance settlements received in 1983 as an instrument for 1984 net worth. I make the choice 
between inheritances and insurance settlements based on the significance of these variables in 
the wealth regression. 
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7 Clearly, these results hold for the mean household in each regression sample. Needless to say, the effects are not 
additive over samples, since the mean household in the rate of wealth increase regression is not necessarily the 
same household in the rate of return to capital regression or in the saving rate regression.  
8 Here, I show the specification for the saving rate regression only. For the other regressions, the specification is 
mainly the same, except for the income variability and capital gains variables, as mentioned before. 
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In this system, equation (8.2.a) is the same as in (8.1). Equation (8.2.b) explains the “starting a 
business” latent variable, 
*
i D , in terms of a set of factors, which contains all variables in  i X , 
initial household wealth and a dummy variable,  i FATH , that is equal to one if the household 
head’s father is a businessman and zero otherwise. I use  i FATH  as an exclusion restriction to 
identify equation (8.2.a). The next equation, (8.2.c), represents the binary characteristic of the 
variable  i D . The last equation is the reduced form expression of initial wealth. As mentioned 
before, I use  i INH  as an instrument for household wealth. Crucially, the error terms,  1 u ,  2 u  and 
3 u  are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero means and arbitrarily correlated 
among themselves. 
What I am mainly interested in is the estimation of  1 δ  in equation (8.2.a), which is 
complicated by the endogeneity bias introduced by the dummy variable,  i D . The parameter  1 δ  
measures the effect of starting a business on the saving component, however the ordinary least 
squares estimate of  1 δ  will be biased since the error terms  1 u  and  2 u  are correlated. This 
happens when some unobservable characteristics of those who have a high saving component 
are correlated with the unobservable characteristics of those who start a business. For instance, 
there could be an unobservable “self-control” variable, which could make the household head 
more likely to save and to become a business owner. In this case,  1 u  and  2 u  would be positively 
correlated. 
To estimate this system, I start by accounting for the endogeneity of initial wealth in 
equation (8.2.b). To do this, I run ordinary least squares regression on equation (8.2.d) and save 
the residuals,  3 ˆ u . Then, I estimate equation (8.2.b) by probit regression, using  3 ˆ u  as an 
additional regressor. The estimates of equations (8.2.d) and (8.2.b-c) are shown in Table 13.  
Following these, I estimate equation (8.2.a). To account for the endogeneity bias caused 
by the dummy variable i D , I estimate this system by using the two-step estimation method 
pioneered by Heckman and later derived in the broader context of simultaneous models with   20
censored endogenous regressors by Vella (1993). The steps involved are: (1) Estimation of 
equations (8.2.b) and (8.2.c), with the additional regressor  3 ˆ u , by probit regression, and the 
derivation of the generalized residuals vector,  2 ˆ u .
9 (2) Addition of generalized residuals as a 
regressor to equation (8.2.a) to obtain equation (8.3) and the estimation of (8.3) by ordinary least 
squares. 
 
12 1 ˆ '' ii i i i YX D u u β δλ =+ ++  .      ( 8 . 3 )  
 
This procedure yields consistent estimates of  2 δ and λ . The estimate of  2 δ  shows the effect of 
becoming a business owner on the saving behavior, controlling for the endogeneity of the 
business ownership decision. To illustrate the meaning of λ , let’s proceed as follows. The 
equation I am estimating is the following:  
 
(| ) ' ( | ) 1 1 EY D X D Eu D ii i i i i β δ =+ + . 
 
When the two error terms are correlated, the value that  1 u  takes depends on the value that  i D  
takes. Furthermore, when  1 u  and  2 u are jointly normally distributed, the expectation has a 
particular form:  ( ) i u i D i u E i D i u E 2
2
2 2 , 1 ˆ ' ) | 2 ( . ) | 1 ( λ σ σ = = , where  2 , 1 σ  is the correlation 
coefficient between  1 u  and  2 u , and 
2
2 σ is the variance of  2 u .
10 I can rewrite the above as: 
 
'
2 ˆ (| ) ' 1 EY D X D u ii i i i βδλ =+ +  
 
                                                           
9 The generalized residual vector in the probit model takes the form 
) ' ( )] ' ( 1 [
) ' ( )] ' ( [
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, where  (.) φ  and 
(.) Φ  are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution evaluated at the probit estimates of γ , the matrix Z includes all regressors.  
10 Since the coefficient of the generalized residual is 
2
1,2 2 / σ σ , a t-test on this coefficient is equivalent to a test of 
correlation between the two error terms and therefore a test of endogeneity.  
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The estimates of  1 δ  and λ are shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10, columns II. A comparison of 
the results in columns (I) and (II) of these tables yields some interesting findings. In the rate of 
return to wealth and the inheritance rate regressions the sign of the business ownership dummy 
is invariant to the addition of the generalized residual vector. Furthermore, the estimate of λ  is 
not significant in most regressions. As a result, the addition of the generalized residual vector to 
these regressions is not fully warranted. A single-equation model, as in (8.2.a), is more 
justifiable than a two-equation model in these cases.  
On the other hand, in the rate of return on capital regressions, the coefficient on  i D  turns 
from positive to negative once the effect of endogeneity is controlled for. That is, households 
that become business owners have lower capital gains-to-wealth ratios, after correcting for the 
endogeneity bias. Although the correction factor is not statistically significant in all cases, its 
effect on the sign of business ownership dummy variable is persistent. That households use 
capital gains toward setting up their new businesses, or that the newly-established businesses 
experience capital appreciation can explain the endogeneity.  
   In the saving rate regressions, when endogeneity is taken into account the magnitude of 
the coefficient on  i D  becomes larger, however the addition of the correction factor lowers the 
degree statistical significance of the estimates of  1 δ  and λ . Therefore, the single-equation 
model is more appropriate. One also wonders if investing in businesses is what generates the 
positive and significant coefficient estimate for  i D  in the saving rate regressions. To test this, I 
rerun these regressions after excluding investment in businesses from the saving rate definition 
and present my estimates in Table 11.  As expected, the magnitude of  1 δ  becomes smaller, since 
a major part of saving has been dropped. With the new definition of the saving rate, statistical 
significance of  1 δ  estimate depends on the period of analysis and the definition of the business 
ownership dummy. In the longer period, 1984-1994, only one out of my three estimates are 
different from zero. This shows us that investment in business assets is an important part of 
saving for business owner households.  
Another question that I would like to answer is whether the households that save more 
out of their income become business owners later. To answer this question, I run probit 
regressions that explain the probability of becoming a business owner. I restrict my sample to 
households that have no business experience during 1984-1989 period. In the two versions that I   22
tried, I estimate the probability of starting a business in 1990, and in 1990 or 1991. All variables 
previously mentioned in the text are included as regressors. As seen in Table 12, saving out of 
family income does not have an effect on the probability of starting a business. Controlling for 
capital gains, inheritances and other factors as shown in the table, or using saving rates instead 
of saving levels do not change the results. In all cases, I fail to find a link from saving to the 
likelihood of starting a business. Therefore, I conclude that households do not save more to 
become business owners as argued in the literature. Rather, it is the case that business owner 
households save more.  
 
Specification Issues 
I would like to mention that my findings are quite robust to specification changes. My general 
finding is under different specifications, the positive sign and the high significance of the 
coefficient on business ownership dummy in the saving rate regression remain unaffected. In the 
other regressions, the signs of some coefficient estimates change but the significance levels stay 
the same.  
It is striking how the coefficient estimates change when the sample is selected 
differently. The only difference in the samples used to estimate (8.1) with Dummy 1 and 
Dummy 2 is that in the first one, business ownership continues throughout the analysis period 
while in the second one, it starts sometime after the first year. Although this is not an enormous 
change, the estimates are considerably different, with the exception of those in the saving rate 
regressions. This makes the robustness of results in the rates of return on wealth and on capital 
regressions questionable, both here and in the literature. The reason is that there is substantial 
variation in these rates among households, even after truncating the highest and lowest 1% of 
each distribution. Therefore the estimates depend somewhat on the sample selection rule and on 
the period analyzed. 
Finally, for better exposition, in Tables 13 and 14, I present detailed results of estimation 
of equations (8.1) through (8.5). I select saving rate as the dependent variable, since it is the 
variable of major interest in this paper. Many parameter estimates have the anticipated signs, but 
few of them are statistically significant. In the saving rate regressions, average income plays an 
important role in determining saving out of income. Also, the number of children has a 
significant effect. The negative coefficients on the number of school-age children seem to   23
support the conjecture that large families save less, rather than the conjecture that these families 
have higher saving rates due to increased incentives to save for kids’ college.  In the business 
ownership probit regressions, race, sex and marital status of the household head are the 
significant determining factors, along with the number of children in the household. Initial 
household wealth has a positive and highly significant effect on the probability of starting a 
business in all three probit regressions.  
   
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The importance of understanding the saving behavior of entrepreneurs is clear. This group of 
households owns a substantial part of aggregate household wealth in the United States. Previous 
work in this area has reported that entrepreneurial households have higher wealth-income ratios 
and therefore they save more. The concept of saving in these studies has been the rate of wealth 
increase, but not much attention was paid on the components of the wealth change. As far as I 
know, this is the first paper that asks whether entrepreneurial households save more out of their 
income or their wealth increase is mostly due to capital gains or wealth transfers, such as 
inheritances. 
In this paper, I compare the savings of entrepreneurs to others by testing whether 
business owner households have higher components of wealth change than other households. To 
do this, I decompose the total wealth change of a household into active savings and capital 
gains. Then, I derive a measure of saving out of family income by subtracting the wealth change 
components that do not originate from family income, such as inheritances and changes in 
wealth due to changes in family composition, from active savings. I perform the tests using data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for five and ten-year panels over the period from 
1984 to 1994.  
My analyses show that business owner households do save more out of their family 
income. This finding is robust to various definitions of business ownership and changes in 
specification. This is a new result. Although previous studies found that entrepreneurial 
households have higher saving rates, they defined saving as the change in wealth and not as 
saving out of family income.    24
Surprisingly, I do not find strong support for the hypothesis that business owner 
households have higher rates of wealth increase when compared to households that never own a 
business, which contradicts the results in the literature. Also, in these samples it is ambiguous 
whether business owners have higher rates of capital gains. These can be explained partly by the 
high variance in the data of rates of return on wealth and on capital, which causes the estimates 
of the effect of business ownership to depend on the sample selection rule. In the case of 
inheritances, I, once again, do not find any evidence for a higher inheritance-to-wealth ratio for 
business owner households. Inheritances are received in large amounts but by a small 
percentage of the households in the sample. Although many of the recipients are business 
owners (either at the time or about to become), the difference disappears in the regression 
analyses. It appears that, although business owners save more out of their income, there is 
substantial variation in capital gains (or losses) and wealth transfers, which ultimately produce 
substantial variation in the changes in wealth.  
The literature on wealth and entrepreneurship claims that entrepreneurial households 
save more than other households because they have to overcome liquidity constraints to 
establish a business. However, in my analyses I do not find such evidence. Instead, the evidence 
favors the idea that households that are already business owners save more than others, either 




                                                           
11 I do not argue here that financing constraints are not important at all. In fact, they can be crucial for the 
establishment of large businesses. However, as mentioned by Meyer (1990), many households start 
entrepreneurship with a small business, which probably requires very little initial capital. If they become successful, 
they expand the business and sell it to acquire a more capital intensive business.   25
REFERENCES 
 
Carroll, Christopher D. and Andrew A. Samwick. 1998. “How Important is Precautionary 
Saving?” Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (3): 410-19. 
 
Cressy, Robert. 2000. “Credit Rationing or Entrepreneurial Risk Aaversion? An Alternative 
Explanation for the Evans and Jovanovic Finding.” Economic Letters 66: 235-40. 
 
Evans, David S. and Boyan Jovanovic. 1989. “An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice 
under Liquidity Constraints.” Journal of Political Economy 97 (4): 808-27. 
 
Evans, David S. and Linda S. Leighton. 1989. “Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship.” 
American Economic Review 79 (3): 519-35.  
 
Gentry, William M. and R. Glenn Hubbard. 2000a. “Entrepreneurship and Household Saving.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7894. 
 
―――. 2000b. “Tax Policy and Entrepreneurial Activity.” American Economic Review 90: 
283-87. 
 
Gittleman, Maury and Edward N. Wolff. 2001. “Racial Wealth Disparities: Is the Gap Closing?” 
Working Paper no. 311. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute. 
 
Gordon, Roger H. 1998. “Can High Personal Tax Rates Encourage Entrepreneurial Activity?” 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45: 49-80. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, David Joulfaian and Harvey S. Rosen. 1994. “Sticking It Out: 
Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints.” Journal of Political Economy 102 
(1): 53-75. 
 
Hurst, Erik and Annamaria Lusardi. 2001. “Liquidity Constraints, Wealth Accumulation and 
Entrepreneurship.”Mimeo.  
 
Meyer, Bruce. 1990. “Why Are There So Few Black Entrepreneurs?” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 3537. 
 
Quadrini, Vincenzo. 1997. “Entrepreneurship, Saving and Social Mobility.” Discussion Paper 
No.116. Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
 
Quadrini, Vincenzo. 1999. “The Importance of Entrepreneurship for Wealth Concentration and 
Mobility.” Review of Income and Wealth 45:1-19. 
 
Vella, Francis. 1993. “A Simple Estimator for Simultaneous Models with Censored Endogenous 
Regressors.” International Economic Review 34 (2): 441-57.  
    26
Table 1A: Business owners’ share in population and total wealth in 1984  
by wealth percentiles: 
  Business  owners'  share  in
   population   total wealth
    (%)   (%)
Overall 12.20 42.26
Wealth 1-20 0.58 23.09










Table 1B: Business owners’ share in population and total income in 1984  
by income percentiles: 
  Business  owners'  share  in
   population   total income
    (%)   (%)
Overall 12.20 19.94
Income 1-20 2.90 -38.84









Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984 PSID data. 
Note: See the Appendix for the definition of household wealth. 
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Table 2A: Mean and Median Values of Wealth and its Components in 1984  
and Asset Ownership Rates; Business Owners vs. Others (in thousand dollars): 
 
     Business Owners Others
Mean Median % with Share Mean Median % with Share
asset in NW asset in NW
Wealth (NW) 295.6 149.0 - 56.1 24.0 -
House Value 72.6 60.0 83.25 24.54 35.1 20.0 56.79 62.55
Mortgage Principal 19.4 5.5 55.37 6.56 9.8 0.0 33.68 17.41
Real Estate 50.5 0.0 43.09 17.09 8.5 0.0 16.79 15.20
Business 136.1 40.0 100.00 46.03 0.0 0.0 0 0.00
Stocks 17.1 0.0 39.24 5.79 5.7 0.0 22.81 10.18
Checking/Saving 22.3 6.0 93.33 7.53 10.8 1.5 79.02 19.19
Debt 3.4 0.0 47.59 1.16 1.6 0.0 46.12 2.88
Other Savings 9.1 0.0 35.09 3.07 2.6 0.0 21.69 4.65
Wealth 159.6 83.0 - 53.97 56.1 24.0 -
(excluding businesses)
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984 PSID data. 
Notes: Mean and median values are in thousand 1984 dollars, computed over the entire sample. “Share in 




Table 2B: Mean and Median Values of Household Wealth, Income  
and Wealth-Income ratio in 1984; Business Owners vs. Others (1984 dollars): 
 
Business Owners  Others
Mean Median Mean Median
Wealth $295,627 $149,000 $56,095 $24,000
Income $40,109 $32,200 $21,541 $18,000
W / I  7.37 4.63 2.60 1.33
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984 PSID data. 
Note: The mean (median) value of W/I is calculated as mean (median) household wealth in the sample 
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Table 3: Composition of Business Owners versus Others, in percentages, and Mean and Median 
Household Incomes: 
1984 1989
Business Others Business Others
Owners Owners
Race/Ethnicity
White 96.63 82.06 92.72 82.27
Black 1.41 14.38 2.39 14.58
Latin American 1.60 2.95 3.25 1.96
Others 0.36 0.61 1.64 1.18
Age group
<25 2.64 9.52 1.96 4.72
25-34 19.20 26.62 16.66 22.77
35-49 40.42 22.99 46.95 36.37
50-61 24.12 16.16 18.25 13.91
62-69 6.89 9.48 9.57 9.36
70+ 6.73 15.24 6.6 12.86
Education
<High 17.66 30.86 13.9 22.18
High School 32.59 35.54 25.61 33.71
Some college 21.82 16.62 24.48 20.7
College Grad. 27.92 16.98 36.01 23.41
HousingTenure
Homeowner 83.25 56.81 84.16 62.6
Renter 16.75 43.19 15.84 37.4
Family Type
<65 yrs, Married with Childen 44.37 25.39 37.86 26.29
<65 yrs, Married, No Children 25.42 17.16 30.19 20.63
<65 yrs, Fem.Head with Children 2.03 9.19 1.09 7.3
65+ yrs, Married 7.74 8.33 9.24 8.62
65+ yrs, Female Head 1.60 10.26 3.28 8.33
65+ yrs, Male Head 1.02 2.03 0.8 1.89
Others 17.81 27.65 17.55 26.95
Labor Market Status
Working 87.05 64.59 87.16 69.13
Unemployed 
(1) 1.02 5.41 0.72 4.1
Retired 9.42 17.71 9.86 19.08
Other 2.51 12.29 2.26 7.69
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984 and 1999 PSID data. 
Notes: Classifications are made according to the characteristics of the household heads.  
(1) “Unemployed” includes those who are looking for work and those who are temporarily laid off.  
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Table 4: Testing Whether Entrepreneurial Households Have Higher Wealth-Income Ratios; 





Coefficient 12362 8086.9 4.05
t-statistic 8.17 7.4 30.85
N 6911 5594 5484
R
2 0.0279 0.0413 0.2834
1989
Coefficient 12914 12278 2.39
t-statistic 5.95 4.75 27.32
N 7112 5760 5646
R
2 0.0078 0.0063 0.3373
1994
Coefficient 12084 13967 3.53
t-statistic 4.21 3.98 18.11
N 6499 5188 5086
R
2 0.0035 0.0041 0.1567
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the PSID data, years 1984, 1989 and 1994. 
Notes: “Coefficient” and “t-statistic” are for the business ownership dummy variable. Samples in regressions (1) 
include all households. Samples in regressions (2) and (3) exclude the households whose heads are younger than 22 
or older than 65. In regressions in columns (3) top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution is truncated. All 
regressions include control variables, which are total household income and its square, age of the household head 
and its square, the number of children in the household, dummy variables for the education, sex, race and marital 
status of the head. 
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Table 5A: Mean and median change in wealth between 1984 and 1989  
(in 1994 dollars):  
 
1984 1989 ∆ Wealth Total % Annual %
Wealth Wealth Change Change
No business Mean 71,809 99,159 27,350 38.09 0.07
Median 32,807 43,623 3,994 32.97 0.06
Started business Mean 95,397 189,268 93,871 98.40 0.15
Median 57,055 138,639 45,383 142.99 0.19
Ended business Mean 232,209 228,037 -4,173 -1.80 0.00
Median 113,454 89,637 -13,418 -20.99 -0.05
Continued business Mean 315,939 389,283 73,344 23.21 0.04
Median 223,227 262,935 25,454 17.79 0.03
  
 
Table 5B: Mean and median change in wealth (excluding business assets) between 1984 and 
1989 (in 1994 dollars):  
 
1984 1989 ∆ Wealth Total % Annual %
Wealth Wealth Change Change
No business Mean 69,863 97,009 27,146 38.86 0.07
Median 32,807 43,026 4,001 31.15 0.06
Started business Mean 85,812 135,690 49,879 58.12 0.10
Median 52,847 86,888 19,955 64.41 0.10
Ended business Mean 115,958 152,032 36,073 31.11 0.06
Median 81,145 89,637 14,434 10.47 0.02
Continued business Mean 170,487 234,570 64,083 37.59 0.07
Median 111,257 151,307 28,033 36.00 0.06
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-1989 PSID data. 
Note: The “business ownership” definition of entrepreneurship is used here. Trimmed longitudinal 
sample is used, see Appendix for details. “Annual % change” is the x in the formula  z x + = + 1 ) 1 (
5 , 
where z is the “Total % change” in the period. 
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Table 6: Mean and Median Values of Saving Components, by Business Ownership Categories 
(in thousand 1994 dollars): 
1984-89 1989-94
% of mean % of mean
in total  in total 
Mean Median change Mean Median change
($) ($) (%) ($) ($) (%)
No Business Ownership
Total Change 31.2 5.2 100.0 24.0 4.8 100.0
Capital Gains 13.6 0.0 43.6 7.3 0.0 30.5
Savings out of Income 11.5 4.3 36.9 15.2 4.0 63.3
Inheritances 2.4 0.0 7.7 2.6 0.0 10.8
Net Inflows due to ∆Comp 4.5 0.0 14.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.4
Net Inflows from Annuities -0.8 0.0 -2.5 -1.0 0.0 -4.3
Start Business
Total Change 109.1 49.1 100.0 102.8 55.4 100.0
Capital Gains 70.4 14.9 64.5 59.6 34.1 57.9
Savings out of Income 37.0 27.8 33.9 34.3 25.1 33.4
Inheritances 6.8 0.0 6.2 6.1 0.0 5.9
Net Inflows due to ∆Comp -1.8 0.0 -1.7 3.3 0.0 3.2
Net Inflows from Annuities -3.2 0.0 -3.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
End Business
Total Change 20.5 -12.7 100.0 6.2 -4.8 100.0
Capital Gains -8.3 -14.3 -40.6 -16.3 -14.0 -263.1
Savings out of Income -9.3 4.2 -45.6 15.4 12.4 249.1
Inheritances 6.9 0.0 33.6 5.2 0.0 83.9
Net Inflows due to ∆Comp 2.3 0.0 11.5 1.0 0.0 16.7
Net Inflows from Annuities 28.9 0.0 141.2 0.8 0.0 13.4
Continue Business
Total Change 81.0 34.6 100.0 61.1 38.9 100.0
Capital Gains 
(1) -8.6 -5.3 -10.6 -38.2 3.0 -62.6
Savings out of Income 86.1 38.0 106.4 99.5 30.4 163.0
Inheritances 6.4 0.0 7.8 4.3 0.0 7.1
Net Inflows due to ∆Comp -1.1 0.0 -1.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Net Inflows from Annuities -1.8 0.0 -2.3 -4.4 0.0 -7.2
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-1989 and 1989-1994 PSID data. 
Notes: Categories are determined by the business ownership status of the household in the beginning and the end of 
the analysis period. Sample selection: Sample includes households whose heads remain the same over the analysis 
period. Households whose heads are younger than 22, older than 65 or retired are excluded from the sample. Top 
and bottom 1% of each saving distribution is truncated.  
(1) For this group of households, mean and median capital gains are –22.3 and –7.1 thousand dollars, respectively, 
on business assets and 13.7 and 1.8 thousand dollars on other assets in the 1984-89 period. In the 1989-94 period, 
the mean and median capital gains on business assets are –2.5 and –4.9 thousand dollars, respectively, on business 
assets and –35.7 and 7.9 thousand dollars on other assets.     32
Table 7: Mean and Median Rates of Change in Wealth and Its Components, by Business 
Ownership Categories:   
       1984-89         1989-94
Mean Median Mean Median
(%) (%) (%) (%)
No Business Ownership
Rate of Wealth Increase 47.29 30.92 33.43 23.86
Rate of Return on Capital  23.62 0.00 11.03 0.00
Saving Rate 6.22 2.63 11.51 3.21
Inheritances-Wealth 3.23 0.00 2.47 0.00
Net Inflows from Family Comp.Changes-Wealth -0.36 0.00 -0.34 0.00
Net Inflows from Annuities-Wealth 0.52 0.00 -0.76 0.00
Start Business
Rate of Wealth Increase 150.65 118.43 109.92 124.95
Rate of Return on Capital  95.67 45.79 62.10 60.13
Saving Rate 14.67 10.61 20.99 8.32
Inheritances-Wealth 5.75 0.00 2.85 0.00
Net Inflows from Family Comp.Changes-Wealth -1.62 0.00 0.05 0.00
Net Inflows from Annuities-Wealth 0.20 0.00 -0.33 0.00
End Business
Rate of Wealth Increase 6.73 -22.77 -15.67 -14.31
Rate of Return on Capital  -4.29 -19.65 -25.78 -33.24
Saving Rate -1.76 1.32 1.65 6.51
Inheritances-Wealth 1.32 0.00 1.20 0.00
Net Inflows from Family Comp.Changes-Wealth -0.18 0.00 -0.31 0.00
Net Inflows from Annuities-Wealth -9.74 0.00 0.03 0.00
Continue Business
Rate of Wealth Increase 57.82 29.05 -2.17 18.53
Rate of Return on Capital  26.12 -0.23 -10.91 1.32
Saving Rate 20.72 13.25 8.31 9.32
Inheritances-Wealth 2.52 0.00 0.50 0.00
Net Inflows from Family Comp.Changes-Wealth -0.75 0.00 -0.42 0.00
Net Inflows from Annuities-Wealth 0.35 0.00 -0.42 0.00
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-1989 and 1989-1994 PSID data. 
Notes: All rates are expressed as percentages. Saving rate is saving out of family income divided by average family 
income during the five-year period. All other rates are defined as the ratio to initial wealth. Mean values are 
computed as the total for the numerator divided by total for the denominator. Household rates (except for the saving 
rate) are defined only if initial wealth is positive. Categories are determined by the business ownership status of the 
household in the beginning and the end of the analysis period. 
Sample selection: Sample includes households whose heads remain the same over the analysis period. Households 
whose heads are younger than 22, older than 65 or retired are excluded from the sample. Top and bottom 1% of 
each saving rate distribution is truncated.  
(1) In this group, in the 1989-94 period, mean and median rates of capital gains on business assets (for those with 
positive business assets) were –25.28% and –16.99% respectively. Mean and median rates of capital gains on non-
business assets were –1.03% and 1.85% respectively, in the same period.   33
 
Table 8: Estimation of equations (8.1) and (8.3), 1984-1989: 
Dummy  1 Dummy  2 Dummy  3
II II I II I I
   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Rate of  D -36.89 -0.69 23.61 0.13 253.067 2.23 1517.706 1.70 88.8334 1.61 -608.938 -2.95
Change in ν hat -19.86 -0.19 -679.886 -1.54 443.816 3.27
Wealth N 2054 2054 2048 2048 2780 2780
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.0918 0.0942 0.0711 0.0795
Capital Gains D 15.66 0.78 -34.86 -0.37 95.391 2.59 -195.067 -0.58 35.31807 1.69 -269.359 -2.76
to Wealth  ν hat 33.47 0.67 154.5861 0.87 192.963 2.84
Ratio N 2068 2068 2055 2055 2780 2780
R
2 0.04 0.04 0.0393 0.0396 0.0314 0.0413
Saving D 12.80 4.79 37.10 2.99 11.00 5.33 36.12 2.92 5.38201 4.90 14.8213 2.01
Rate ν hat -13.12 -2.00 -13.34 -2.04 -5.7203 -1.31
N 3049 3049 3086 3086 3899 3899
R
2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.0634 0.0658
Inheritance D -1.9E-03 -2.2E-03 2.16 0.96 5.1216 1.79 13.1688 0.68 1.471036 1.66 3.2865 1.19
Rate ν hat -1.31 -1.05 -4.3111 -0.44 -1.136 -0.72
N 2086 2086 2081 2081 2808 2808
R
2 0.012 0.011 0.0159 0.0157 0.0091 0.0087
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-89 panel of the PSID data, see the Appendix for a description. 
Notes: 
Sample selection: Samples are restricted to households whose heads are the same throughout the periods of analysis. Households whose heads are younger than 
22, older than 65 or retired are excluded. Top and bottom 1% of each saving component distribution is truncated.  
“Coeff.” and “t” are coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the business ownership dummy variable and the generalized residual. All regressions include the 
demographic controls mentioned in the text. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 9: Estimates of equations (8.1) and (8.3), 1989-1994:  
Dummy  1 Dummy  2 Dummy  3
II I II I I I I
     Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)     Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)     Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Rate of  D -48.53 -0.98 -220.97 -1.62 172.03 1.79 1594.18 1.42 0.28578 0.01 -577.92 -3.03
Change in ν hat 131.54 1.74 -717.59 -1.32 370.208 3.07
Wealth N 2054 2054 1988 1988 2777 2777
R
2 0.03 0.04 0.0512 0.0526 0.0338 0.041
Capital Gains D 20.16 0.65 -176.11 -1.69 93.011 1.33 -285.359 -0.76 0.65107 0.03 -311.03 -3.10
to Wealth  ν hat 130.95 2.16 190.811 1.07 199.896 3.26
Ratio N 2055 2055 1989 1989 2777 2777
R
2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0198 0.0173 0.0222
Saving D 4.25 1.57 9.17 0.74 7.19 2.37 51.55 2.66 3.2273 2.41 17.157 1.61
Rate ν hat -2.98 -0.45 -22.33 -2.30 -8.5711 -1.32
N 3023 3023 2985 2985 3869 3869
R
2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.018 0.0174
Inheritance D -1.30 -1.61 -5.45 -1.85 -0.0743 -0.05 -7.9427 -0.50 -0.5458 -0.86 -4.9023 -2.22
Rate ν hat 2.56 1.59 3.9808 0.52 2.77514 2.05
N 2079 2079 2015 2015 2805 2805
R
2 0.0016 0.0026 0.0023 0.002 0.0012 0.0023
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1989-94 panel of the PSID data, see the Appendix for a description. 
Notes: 
Sample selection: Samples are restricted to households whose heads are the same throughout the periods of analysis. Households whose heads are younger than 
22, older than 65 or retired are excluded. Top and bottom 1% of each saving component distribution is truncated.  
“Coeff.” and “t” are coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the business ownership dummy variable and the generalized residual. All regressions include the 
demographic controls mentioned in the text. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 10:  Estimation of equations (8.1) and (8.3), 1984-1994.  
Dummy  1 Dummy  2 Dummy  3
II I I I I II I
   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)   Eqn. (8.1)     Eqn. (8.3)
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Rate of  D 165.46 0.98 -339.87 -0.82 286.675 0.90 198.187 0.12 51.3852 0.45 -1039 -2.39
Change in ν hat 309.23 1.06 46.6596 0.06 703.01 2.37
Wealth N 1272 1272 1282 1282 2044 2044
R
2 0.09 0.09 0.0985 0.0978 0.0867 0.0905
Capital Gains D 142.92 2.07 -154.34 -0.79 117.498 0.92 -735.42 -1.04 119.944 1.72 -348.3 -1.26
to Wealth  ν hat 170.95 1.45 449.281 1.15 302.62 1.62
Ratio N 1269 1269 1278 1278 2044 2044
R
2 0.01 0.01 0.0062 0.0062 0.0101 0.0124
Saving D 12.64 4.45 19.35 2.35 2.60 1.26 10.80 1.05 2.63659 2.94 20.099 4.26
Rate ν hat -5.02 -1.20 -4.29 -0.84 -10.77 -3.64
N 1854 1854 1880 1880 2783 2783
R
2 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.0489 0.0642
Inheritance D 0.70 0.15 -21.29 -1.36 2.8454 0.55 27.8968 1.01 1.9462 0.66 -26.2 -2.06
Rate ν hat 13.43 1.20 -13.246 -1.04 17.867 2.01
N 1282 1282 1297 1297 2064 2064
R
2 0.0128 0.0159 0.0124 0.0121 0.011 0.014
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-94 panel of the PSID data, see the Appendix for a description. 
Notes: 
Sample selection: Samples are restricted to households whose heads are the same throughout the periods of analysis. Households whose heads are younger than 
22, older than 65 or retired are excluded. Top and bottom 1% of each saving component distribution is truncated.  
“Coeff.” and “t” are coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the business ownership dummy variable and the generalized residual. All regressions include the 
demographic controls mentioned in the text. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.   36 
 
Table 11: Saving rate regressions; all three periods and three dummy definitions; saving rate excludes investment in business assets 
Dummy 1 Dummy 2 Dummy 3
II II I II I I
     Eqn. (8.2.a)     Eqn. (8.3)     Eqn. (8.2.a)     Eqn. (8.3)     Eqn. (8.2.a)     Eqn. (8.3)
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Saving D 7.79 3.23 26.95 2.31 4.30 2.61 28.26 2.64 2.1633 2.14 1.4949 0.25
Rate ν hat -10.61 -1.70 -12.73 -2.23 0.3856 0.11
1984-89 N 3049 3049 3081 3081 3900 3900
R
2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.0456 0.0452
Saving D 1.78 0.70 4.01 0.35 3.1848 1.23 50.692 2.52 1.996 1.54 13.499 1.30
Rate ν hat -1.54 -0.24 -23.92 -2.35 -7.0779 -1.11
1989-94 N 3022 3022 2986 2986 3869 3869
R
2 0.02 0.02 0.0251 0.0283 0.0186 0.0163
Saving D 5.83 2.23 13.87 2.17 -0.16 -0.10 5.59 0.59 0.5462 0.67 11.757 1.73
Rate ν hat -5.78 -1.78 -3.02 -0.63 -7.138 -1.71
1984-94 N 1851 1851 1877 1877 2783 2783
R
2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.0532 0.0553
 
Source: Author’s calculations using PSID data, see the Appendix for a description. 
Notes to Tables 11 and 12: 
Sample selection: Samples are restricted to households whose heads are the same throughout the periods of analysis. Households whose heads are younger than 
22, older than 65 or retired are excluded. Top and bottom 1% of each saving component distribution is truncated.  
“Coeff.” and “t” are coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the business ownership dummy variable and the generalized residual. All regressions include the 
demographic controls mentioned in the text. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 12: Probit estimates of becoming a businessman, effect of savings: 1984-1990 and 1984-
1991. 
 
Became businessman in : 1990     1990 or 1991
N =  2776 2682
percent became businessman 2.99% 5.70%
Coeff. t Coeff.  t
Saving out of family income 3.8E-05 0.10 0.00 -0.65
Log likelihood -348.47 -539.82
Saving out of family income 1.6E-04 0.31 -6.0E-05 -0.20
Capital gains -1.7E-04 -0.43 7.8E-05 0.23
Inheritances 2.4E-03 1.30 3.0E-03 1.99
Log likelihood -347.73 -537.98
Saving out of family income / Income 4.3E-04 0.30 -2.3E-04 -0.28
Capital gains / Wealth 2.3E-16 0.02 2.5E-16 0.03
Inheritances / Wealth -1.5E-03 -0.14 -4.9E-03 -0.18
Log likelihood -348.38 -539.79
Saving out of family income -1.9E-04 -0.23 -9.6E-04 -1.44
Capital gains -1.7E-04 -0.43 8.9E-05 0.25
Inheritances 2.0E-03 1.07 2.2E-03 1.35
Compositional changes -5.1E-06 -0.93 -4.3E-06 -0.98
Annuities -8.2E-07 -0.14 -2.7E-06 -0.51
Log likelihood 694.47 1072.84
Saving out of family income 3.2E-05 0.08 -1.8E-04 -0.69
Capital gains -6.0E-05 -0.15 9.7E-05 0.27
Insurance settlements in 1989 -0.01 -0.32 3.4E-04 0.83
Insurance settlements in 1990 - - 4.8E-04 1.40
Log likelihood -348.41 -538.21
 




Table 13: Wealth and probit regressions for the 1984-89 panel: Dummy 2 
 
II I
(w84)    (Probit)
   Eqn.(8.2.d)  Eqn.(8.2.b-c)
Coeff. t Coeff. t
Intercept -119.4531 -4.7800 -0.6367 0.5492
1984-89 Ave. Income 1.4260 10.8900 0.0074 0.0024
1984-89 Ave. Income squared -0.0002 -0.3100 -1.0E-05 8.6E-06
1984 Age  2.7435 2.0900 -0.0391 0.0294
1984 Age squared  -0.0050 -0.3100 0.0004 0.0004
Dummy:Head High Sch. Grad. 11.8553 2.6500 -0.0444 0.1045
Dummy:Head Some College 4.5073 1.0000 0.0379 0.0944
Dummy:Head College Grad. -6.5144 -1.2700 0.0136 0.1018
Head Black -7.4833 -1.6000 -0.7356 0.1641
Head Latin -18.5046 -1.9700 -0.6438 0.2730
# Children 1 to 5 -1.4694 -0.5200 0.0733 0.0587
# Children 6 to 13 -1.2702 -0.5500 0.1188 0.0485
# Children 14 to 17 -7.8775 -2.3800 -0.1008 0.0771
Dummy: new child 1984-89 -8.3165 -1.7400 -0.1037 0.1004
Dummy:Head employed 1984-89 -9.2351 -2.2900 0.0834 0.0931
Dummy:Wife employed 1984-89 -14.1440 -3.2100 -0.0258 0.0848
Dummy:Married in 1984 30.5531 5.0900 -0.3430 0.1180
Dummy:Married in 1989 -6.5341 -1.0900 0.2473 0.1204
Dummy:Head Female 18.5392 3.3300 -0.7686 0.1537
Businessman Father -5.7625 -1.3000 0.1859 0.0909
Inheritance + Ins. Settlem in 1983 1.0438 2.7200
1984 Net Worth -0.0067 -0.8965





Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-89, 1989-94 and 1984-1994 panels of the PSID data. 
Notes: See note to Table 9. 
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Coeff. t Coeff. t
Intercept 4.67 0.70 -1.54 -0.21
1984-89 Ave. Income 0.19 4.55 0.17 4.09
1984-89 Ave. Income squared 0.00 -0.85 0.00 -0.77
1984 Age  -0.30 -0.85 -0.12 -0.32
1984 Age squared  0.00 1.01 0.00 0.58
Dummy:Head High Sch. Grad. -0.11 -0.10 0.17 0.15
Dummy:Head Some College 0.09 0.08 -0.02 -0.02
Dummy:Head College Grad. 1.80 1.14 1.73 1.09
Dummy:Head Black -0.78 -0.71 0.55 0.41
Dummy:Head Latin 0.99 0.57 2.82 1.39
# Children 1 to 5 0.62 0.99 0.28 0.43
# Children 6 to 13 -0.69 -1.23 -1.19 -1.97
# Children 14 to 17 -2.19 -2.72 -1.91 -2.37
Dummy: new child 1984-89 0.16 0.15 0.46 0.42
Dummy:Head employed 1984-89 0.84 0.68 0.55 0.44
Dummy:Wife employed 1984-89 -0.63 -0.55 -0.53 -0.47
Dummy:Married in 1984 0.45 0.27 2.27 1.22
Dummy:Married in 1989 -0.99 -0.62 -2.24 -1.35
Dummy:Head Female -0.66 -0.37 1.17 0.59
Variation in income  0.66 2.10 0.63 2.00
Capital gains -0.03 -3.80 -0.03 -3.86
1984 Net Worth -0.03 -4.02 -0.03 -4.49
Business Dummy (Dummy 2) 11.00 5.33 36.12 2.92
Correction factor -13.34 -2.04
N 3086 3086
Adj. R-squared 0.0943 0.0965
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1984-89, 1989-94 and 1984-1994 panels of the PSID data. 










The data used in this study come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
Information on wealth was collected every five years, starting from 1984.  The active saving 
supplement is available for the periods 1984-89 and for 1989-94. To the best of my knowledge, 
the PSID is the only dataset that contains information on the active savings and capital gains 
parts of household saving. 
 
  
In this article, household wealth has the following components: 
  
(1) Main Home: The net value of home, which is house value minus the remaining mortgage 
principal. 
(2) Other Real Estate: The net value of any real estate other than main home, such as a second 
home, land, rental real estate, or money owed to you on a land contract. 
(3) Farm and Business: The net value of farm or business assets. 
(4) Stocks: Value of shares of stock of publicly held corporations, mutual funds or investment 
trusts, including stocks in IRAs (IRAs asked separately in 1999). 
(5) Checking and Saving Accounts: Value of checking or saving accounts, money market funds 
or investment trusts, savings bonds, Treasury bills, including IRAs (IRAs asked separately 
in 1999). 
(6) Other Savings: Any other savings or assets, such as bond funds, cash value in a life 
insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust or estate. 
(7) Other Debts: Any other debt besides mortgage; such as credit card debt, student loans, 
medical or legal bills, loans from relatives. 
 
  
The ''Active Savings'' supplement of the PSID asks questions about savings over the past five 
years. These files include information about the following: 
  
(1) Amount of money put aside in private annuities. 
(2) Value of pensions and annuities cashed in. 
(3) Amount of money invested in real estate other than main home. 
(4) Value of additions or improvements worth at least $10,000 to main home or other real 
estate. 
(5) Amount of money invested in a farm or business. 
(6) Amount of money realized from the sale of farm or business. 
(7) Value of debt or assets, at least $5,000, removed from the family by someone leaving the 
family. 
(8) Value of debt or assets, at least $5,000, added to the family by someone joining the family. 
(9) Value of gifts or inheritances of money or property worth at least $10,000.   








Cross-sectional samples include all households. Longitudinal samples include only the 
households whose heads remain the same over the period in question. These samples are further 
restricted to households whose heads are between the ages of 22 and 65, with the purpose of 
taking life-cycle factor into account and excluding the households that are expected not to 
accumulate wealth. Households whose heads are retired are excluded for the same reason.  In 
order to avoid the influence of extreme values, the top and bottom 1% of the wealth change or 
saving component distribution is truncated. The rate of return variables, except for the saving 
rate, are defined only when initial wealth is positive. 
 
 
   
Calculation of Active Savings and Capital Gains on Assets: 
 
(1) Main Home: For each year in the period of study, capital gains and active savings are 
calculated and then summed. If the family does not move during a year, capital gains on 
main home in that year is the increase in the (gross) value of the house; active savings is the 
reduction in remaining mortgage principal. If the family moves during a year, capital gain is 
zero and active saving is the change in the net value of the house. The value of additions or 
improvements is also considered as part of active savings. 
(2) Other Real Estate: Active saving is the investment in real estate (from the ''Active Savings'' 
files). Capital gain is the change in the value of real estate during the period (from the 
wealth supplements) minus active savings. 
(3) Farm and Business: Active saving is the investment in farm and business. Capital gain is the 
change in the value of the asset during the period minus active savings. 
(4) Stocks: Active saving is the net value of stocks bought and sold. Capital gain is the change 
in the value of the asset during the period minus active savings. 
(5) Checking and Saving Accounts: Capital gain is assumed to be zero; active saving is the 
change in the value of the asset. 
(6) Other Savings: Capital gain is assumed to be 1%; active saving is the change in the value of 
the asset minus the capital gain. 
(7) Other Debts: Capital gain is assumed to be equal to the rate of inflation, which is based on 
CPI-U. Active saving is the change in the value of the asset minus the capital gain. 
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Calculation of Savings out of Family Income: 
  
In order to find out the portion of savings made out of family income, the saving items that 
originate from outside the family must be deducted. These are: 
  
(1) inheritances received during the period, 
(2) the amount of money put into annuities or annuities cashed in, 
(3) wealth changes due to changes in family composition. 
 
Information about these items is found in the ''Active Savings'' files. 
  
“Saving out of family income” is active savings described above, minus the sum of these three 
items. 
 
 